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The God Insight: Vengence or Destiny?
John Bacon
God preaches, a noted Clergyman –
And the sermon is never long,
So instead of getting to Heaven, at last –
I’m going, all along.1
Preface
For most of my life, I have pondered the meaning of the religion in
which I was reared (Presbyterianism) and of its rivals (Anglicanism,
Roman Catholicism and Judaism). The upshot of my old age is a
virtually unheard-of religion, roughly in the Judeo-Christian tradition,
which I call ‘Ætism’. (It rhymes with ‘elitism’, minus the ‘el-’, and is
derived from the Greek root meaning ‘cause’.) This unlovely name is
short for the virtually unpronounceable ‘achristological ætiologism’,
which Demosthenes could no doubt have used to good effect in his
speech practice on the beach. Ætism is not, to be sure, entirely new:
its features have been anticipated and evaluated by other thinkers in
the broadly Christian tradition. I’ll try to describe Ætism as
straightforwardly as I can, mindful of the virtues of brevity and
simplicity on the one hand, and accuracy and thoroughness on the
other. Basically, Ætism is a form of Unitarianism or gnosticism. It is
Christianity minus the messiah, Judaism minus the personhood of
God or Manichaeism minus the implacable duality of good and evil.
The presentation here is meant quite seriously. Having been raised as
a species of Protestant, I attended church voluntarily and joyfully
almost every Sunday until I was about 24. Since then, unlike many of
my academic colleagues, I’ve always held religion to be of the first
importance. I believe that religiosity, the impulse to spiritual clarity
and fulfilment, is as essential to our humanity as our defining
penchants for thinking and feeling, procreating and amassing
possessions. Around the age of 24 or 25, like many post-adolescents,
                                                           
1 Emily Dickinson The Poems of Emily Dickinson, ed RW Franklin (Cambridge,
1999) 236.
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I began to have doubts. For a while, I said I was not atheist but
agnostic. Later I came to the core of Ætistic belief: that the world
exists and goes on for the sake of a ‘final cause’ (to employ the
Aristotelian jargon), which is God. I haven’t found very many to
agree with me. (My philosophy colleagues assumed I had missed the
lesson of Philosophy 101 where the notion of the final cause was
shown to be systematically misleading and obsolete, at best a
medieval superstition.) Under social pressure, I even came to doubt
the final-cause hypothesis, which began to seem as wishy-washy to
me as the anthropic hypothesis (lately made much of by weary
scientists, in need of new paradoxes upon which to whet their over-
trained minds). Maybe it’s all just whirling fundamental particles, I
thought, arranged into ever more evolved clusters of protoplasm. I
thought tenderly of a wife and children so constituted. I have since
thought long and hard about this; the summary here is the ultimate
fruit of much whimpering in the wilderness. In particular, I’m
concerned to work out whether God (if such there be) is a God of
vengeance (as the Old Testament strongly suggests) or a God
embodying our ultimate intelligible destiny. My answer is the latter.
My primary, and most controversial, aim is to scotch the preposterous
belief in the redemption of man through the death of a messiah. This
brings us closer to Judaism as well as to early para-Christian heresy.
In fact, the doctrine of redemption through resurrection came
comparatively late on the proto-Christian scene. To the earliest
Jewish Christians, Jesus was a wonder-worker and messiah in the Old
Testament sense. Such a messiah had no need of political execution
and stagy resurrection in order to get about his task. The kerygmatic,
resurrected Christ was rather a favourite of the early gentile
Christians and received its decisive affirmation as a foundation stone
of Christianity from the ever-busy St Paul. So in removing salvation
by crucifixion from Christianity, Ætism is true to its roots in the early
Jewish church. Jesus may have died on the cross: there’s historical
evidence for that. I hold that the significance of that injustice for us is
metaphorical or allegorical: Jesus’ death, supposedly for our benefit,
is a metaphor for our natural (and probably false) conviction that God
cares about us and is determined to help us if we adopt the right
attitude. (Ætism leaves that issue open.) I’ve fast-forwarded to the
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substantive issues in order to give you a foretaste of the unpalatable
medicine to come. Now it’s time to swallow the pill.
Meaning
We can’t get far in a would-be religious context without attending to
the intuitively apprehensible condition of meaning or meaningfulness.
I say ‘intuitively apprehensible’ to forestall the objection that we
possess no such empirical faculty. I maintain that we do possess such
a faculty, in addition to sense-perception, concept formation and
reasoning. The most direct way to demonstrate this is to appeal to
experiences that most of us have had. It is intuitively evident to many
of us that the lives we lead are sometimes meaningful. The vulgar dig
‘Get a life!’ means ‘Make your life meaningful (if you can, you
nebbakh!)’. And I’m afraid it’s lamentably evident to some that they
lead practically meaningless lives.
These claims are best documented by examples drawn from literature.
If the literature is well-crafted, the incidents described may reproduce
the subtle weft of real life but in a possible world, as it were. The
philosopher Richard Taylor, with an eye for the religious proclivity of
man, gives simple, vivid examples of meaningful and meaningless
lives in his book Good and Evil.2 His example of a meaningless life is
that of Sisyphus, who never gets anywhere pushing his stone uphill.
Taylor writes:
Let us suppose that the gods, while condemning Sisyphus to the fate just
described, at the same time, as an afterthought, waxed perversely merciful by
implanting in him a strange and irrational impulse; namely, a compulsive
impulse to roll stones. We may if we like, to make this more graphic, suppose
they accomplish this by implanting in him some substance that has this effect
on his character and drives ... However it may appear to us, Sisyphus’ fate
now does not appear as a condemnation, but the very reverse. His one desire
in life is to roll stones, and he is absolutely guaranteed its endless fulfilment
... his is now filled with mission and meaning, and he seems to himself to
have been given an entry to heaven.3
                                                           
2 Richard Taylor, Good and Evil: a New Direction (New York & London, 1970).
3 Ibid, 259.
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I find this totally unconvincing and rather lame. It suggests that the
presence of a strong desire can suffice to render a meaningless life
meaningful. I may have a persistent, obsessive desire to shoot up
heroin, but that will not make my life meaningful. Everyone can think
of such counterexamples. Taylor is a naturalist in ethics: he bases
value and duty on natural, contingently occurring states of the world
and of the individual agent. Sisyphus’s desire is conceived as a sort of
biochemical infection. Many of us think that there is more to desire
than this: a telos, something for the sake of which the object is
sought. And this telos may be embraced rationally or irrationally. The
meaningfulness of a life is not a disease. Let us turn to the literary
illustrations.
Two examples of strikingly meaningless lives: Rosamond and Mr
Casaubon in Middlemarch, by George Eliot.4 Mr Casaubon is
particularly interesting, especially to academics, because in his
futility he imagines himself to be engaged in important research. His
ARC grant5 (so to speak) is for a compendious work, the key to all
mythologies, which we imagine to illuminate all that is dark and
hidden. The devoted effort to fulfil this prodigious design preoccupies
him both before and after his wedding. He has the gumption to
propose to Dorothea and secure her as wife, little knowing that he is
totally unfit for matrimony and that it will only make him unhappier.
Casaubon spends his honeymoon looking up obscure references in
libraries in Rome, while Dorothea twiddles her fingers. As for fair
Rosamond, she is just a flitting do-nothing. Her prettiness and her
social station ensure her complacency in life. She does possess a
rather sharp tongue, to her mother’s discomfiture. Little does she
know that her childish spendthriftness will undermine her marriage to
Lydgate, turning it into a hell for them both. I think the mean-
inglessness of these two lives is manifest. Now for some meaningful
lives.
                                                           
4 George Eliot, Middlemarch (London, 1973).
5 In Australia, money sorely needed to support university education for the general
populace is diverted into ‘research’ projects and boondoggles by the Australian
Research Council. The idea seems to be to forward ‘research’ by dumbing down
Australian youth to the demotic level of Ozzie beach culture.
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I would instance George Eliot’s Adam Bede,6 Dickens’ Little Dorrit7
and Adalbert Stifter’s Major Stefan Murai in the masterful novella
Brigitta.8 I’ll concentrate on Little Dorrit, a favourite of mine. The
essential point about Amy Dorritt is that, in order simply to get on
with a somewhat abnormal childhood, she must repeatedly help
others who are unappreciative and, in same cases, downright
sabotaging. She must achieve this without becoming sick or perverted
by her tasks, but also without flouting the straitjacket of manners
imposed by Victorian society. Thus she deals with one crisis after
another, tactful and effective beyond her years, often receiving little
thanks. Her trials mature her, although she remains small of stature.
As time goes by, she is rewarded when her sister becomes more
realistic about her vocation (dancing), her self-deluded father’s
becomes more lucid and realistic and, last but not least, when she
becomes aware that her acquaintance with the sturdy engineer Mr
Clennam has not merely cushioned and improved him, but that they
have fallen in love. In the end, Amy reaps every kind of personal sat-
isfaction, growing up to be a fine, altruistic young woman with a life
of service, fulfilment and conjugal love before her. Clearly, this is a
meaningful life.
I take it as an empirical fact, known to us, that some lives or stretches
of life are meaningful and some not. At a more refined level, we also
often apprehend when a life hits a turning point, becoming more
meaningful than it was before. This is the case when Silas Marner
discovers Eppie and adopts her in the book of this name: it’s his
salvation.9 We all know of cases like this; most of us, for example,
know of a man ‘saved by a good woman’ (although the cliché now
seems a little sickening and politically incorrect). By his own
testimony, Saul of Tarsus’s life was totally changed on the road to
Damascus, when he was struck temporarily blind and a voice from
heaven seemed to call out, ‘Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?’. As
                                                           
6 George Eliot, Adam Bede (Harmondsworth, 1980).
7 Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit (London, 2003).
8 Adalbert Stifter, Brigitta (Stuttgart, 1948).
9 George Eliot, Silas Marner, the Weaver of Raveloe (Edinburgh & London, 1861).
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a result, a life became more meaningful. Saul changed his name to
‘Paul’ and the founding of Christianity was assured.
Given that lives or stretches of lives often are meaningful, we now
need to ask how to account for this remarkable fact, which seems so
central to the worthwhileness of the human journey. There must be an
overarching telos, for the sake of which the meaningful life is lived.
In view of the fundamental, overarching character of this ur-telos, it
can only ultimately be the same for all. It is God, I say, or at any rate
an aspect of God. That is not something we know precisely. As in
natural science, it is a probable explanatory hypothesis for which we
have evidence, but not conclusive evidence. With time, we may
expect to acquire more evidence (or perhaps a refutation).10 The
hypothesis is falsifiable, in good Popperian form.
Creation
God is a reasonable posit as the ultimate purpose of human striving,
rational and irrational, emotional and otherwise. Aristotle, who intro-
duced the concept of ‘cause’ into Western philosophy, recognised
four kinds of cause.11 The one dealt with in the preceding section is
called ‘final cause’; in addition there are efficient cause, material
cause and formal cause. The last two are usually left aside these days.
The material cause of a thing is the material it is made of. Aristotle’s
idea is that the thing could not have existed without its matter, so that
the matter must be conceived as helping to cause it. So too with the
formal cause: whatever exists has a form, without which it wouldn’t
be that thing. Thus the form is a cause of the thing.
When we talk of causation or causality these days, we mean efficient
cause. This is the circumstance that makes or helps to make a thing or
event come about. Further distinctions can be made: if several things
act together to bring the effect about, then each of them is a necessary
                                                           
10 This point was made in John Bacon and Juliet Richters, ‘What Shall We Live For?
A Dialogue’ in Venetia Nelson (ed) On Being Human: Meditations on Experience
(Melbourne, 1990) 9–17, 10f.
11 Aristotle, Physica in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed Richard McKeon (New
York, 1941) ch 6, 198a–198b et seq.
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or contributory cause. If together they are enough, they constitute a
jointly sufficient cause. In the modern era, we also recognise causes
that are less than 100%: the cause confers n% probability on the
effect or brings it about with n% probability or probabilises the effect
to an extent of n%.
The fundamental principle of causation nevertheless goes back to the
Middle Ages: the so-called Law of Causality that every event has a
cause. More precisely, every event has a sufficient cause, which can
itself be plural. (Probabilification has not really by general consensus
been brought within the purview of the Law of Causality.) Given the
Law of Causality, today’s events presuppose causal chains stretching
far back into the past. As Aristotle noted, they either stretch back
infinitely or terminate in a first cause. Actually, it would seem that
there must be at least as many first causes as there are backward-
reaching chains. Aristotle held, and Scholasticism followed him in
this, that all first causes must be identical: there is just one first cause.
That is God, asserted the Scholastics. Empirical cosmologists tend
also to assume it. Even if (as is now doubtful) it all began with the
Big Bang, so far as I know nobody has proposed there to have been
two or seven or a million Big Bangs. One is enough, it seems, to get
things off the ground.
My reasoning here is quite close to Aristotle’s. There is a unique final
cause, which Aristotle called the Good. There is a unique first
efficient cause, which Thomas thinks is God. My view is that the
resulting pair ·Creator/Good just is God or a core aspect of God – a
God postulated, though not proven, on the basis of scientific method.
Communication and Faith
We’re left with a philosophical construct that consigns us to
loneliness, so far as the hoped-for companionship of God is
concerned. We don’t know whether our God thinks, feels, hears our
prayers or communicates with us or other beings. And it is not clear
what more in the way of knowledge, observation or inference could
suggest an answer to these questions. I submit that the content of
prayer and voices from heaven, if there are any (such as ‘This is my
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beloved son, in whom I am well pleased’ or ‘Remember not,
remember not, O Lord my sin’ or ‘Turn again, Dick Whittington,
thrice Lord Mayor of London’) are more or less vivid fantasies whose
symbolic content (what we take them to signify) potently motivates
or consoles us. In this, they are a bit like daydreaming. Or they are
like masturbation fantasies, in which a more or less vivid picture of
the coveted activity or object strongly motivates pretend lovemaking,
foreplay or other conation. Praying ‘Lord, let me reach the summit’ is
like the Little Engine that Could puffing away ‘I think I can, I think I
can ..’. The consolation afforded by prayer is not a two-way dialogue,
as it seems. There is no one on the other end of the line, not even an
answering-machine message. Praying is something that we do
sincerely to ourselves. Imagining a conversation partner comes
naturally (as in solitary phone sex) but is not essential. The power of
prayer is to psych ourselves up.
From prayer we move on to the attitude of commitment, considered
absolutely central to Christianity and most religions. The word ‘faith’
is often a synonym of ‘religion’, as when we say ‘Elizabeth Taylor
embraced the Jewish faith’ or ‘Buddhism is not a theistic faith’ or
‘Thus I had to suspend knowledge in order to make room for faith’.
However, when Luther and other Reformers insisted that faith alone
is the way to salvation, they meant loyalty or devotion to God, rather
than any kind of credal belief. We may take a leaf from Buber’s
book, Zwei Glaubensweisen.12 Buber is forced to this title by the fact
that the German Glaube is ambiguous between ‘belief’ and ‘loyalty
or trust’. In English we have the opposite linguistic embarrassment,
as there are too many words in this area: ‘belief’’, ‘loyalty’, ‘trust’,
‘faith’ and so on.
The Protestant is supposed to get faith as a gift from God. If that
doesn’t work, we may be able to psych ourselves into faith. But the
concepts expressed by these labels are not crucial. God doesn’t talk to
us and we talk to God only to psych ourselves into the right God-
centered attitude. So far as we are acquainted with him, God is an
                                                           
12 Martin Buber, Zwei Glaubensweisen (Zürich, 1950).
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intentional object (in Brentano’s sense).13 The Ætistic God cannot be
propitiated, persuaded or bought off. Even if this God were a person
(which is not established), it’s not clear that we could have a
meaningful relationship with such a person. For the Christian, it’s
faith or works. For the Ætist, it’s theological science and works. It’s
not clear that there’s anything to be faithful to or that it would make
any difference whether we were faithful or not.
The Resurrection
The events alleged in the Holy Scriptures that are physically or
otherwise impossible simply did not happen, and it’s silly to believe
that they occurred miraculously. (I don’t say that the many healings
reported of Jesus didn’t happen. We still have an incomplete
understanding of psychosomatic effects and don’t appreciate
sufficiently the difference a foreign cultural base can make.)
Conceiving of such impossible events and imagining their reality is
symbolic thinking, by which we practice taking a sort of science-
fiction point of view.
The announcement made during the Seder that Elijah has come to the
back door, for example, prompting the youngest son to investigate,
doesn’t presuppose an actual visit from the real Elijah. The ritual has
a traditional significance, which we choose to relive each year during
the Seder. Elijah’s visit and our traditional response are not facts that
we record but rituals that we choose to undergo. This is ritual, not
dogma. It’s essentially the same when, during the Christmas pageant
traditionally enacted in many churches on Christmas Eve, the three
Wise Men are seen following the Star: ‘For we have seen His Star in
the East, and are come to worship Him’. Probably baby Jesus never
lay on straw in a manger with lowing cattle hovering over him. Pre-
                                                           
13 The notions of ‘intentional object’ and ‘intentionality’ were introduced by Franz
Brentano, a late nineteenth-century ex-priest who was a prominent source of what
came to be called ‘phenomenology’. Intentionality is an attitude of directedness to an
object, which may or may not exist. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen
Standpunkt (Leipsig, 1874). Interestingly, another book of ex-priest Brentano’s was
Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung!
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sumably Joseph didn’t look 70 and Mary about 19 as they watched
over their new baby; presumably Mary didn’t wear a turquoise robe
with bright red lipstick. The beloved contents of the Christmas
pageant are symbolic, motivating ritual, resolution and practice. We
go to the pageant not to remind ourselves of certain historical facts,
but to marshal and tune up our attitudes and feelings. Not dogma, but
pragma.14
Pragma v Dogma
In the first Reformation, a hotly contested dispute arose over the role
of faith rather than works, in the Christian life. The Catholic view
was that both are needed, with sufficiently many of the latter. The
fact is that the practice of a religion would be ineffectual and arbitrary
without works and works would be arbitrary and unmotivated without
faith. Faith is the dogmatic side of religious adherence; works are the
pragmatic side. (So Martin Buber distinguished factual belief from
the faith of loyalty.) The solution to the faith/works controversy is to
recognise that both are important, but faith without works would be
far more disastrous for religious health than works without faith.
Ritual, pragma and works with no or only vague religious belief is
widespread in modern Judaism, particularly (but not only) of the
Reform variety.15 Christians tend to view this condescendingly as a
                                                           
14 Socrates’ characterisation there of appropriate love has indeed a religious echo.
Love for Plato is not an empirical, factual, psychic or physical occurrence, but a
wellspring of value, symbolized by the white steed in the Phaidros. See Mairéad F
Costigan, Ironic Irony in the Phaidros (Honours thesis, School of Philosophy,
University of Sydney, 1998).
15 One must take care in assessing modern liberal developments in Judaism, such as
Samson Raphael Hirsch’s Modern Orthodoxy, Mordecai Kaplan’s Reconstructionism
and Sherwin Wine’s [Secular] Humanist Judaism. Reconstructionism includes a fully
articulated philosophy of life and society and is far from creedless; Wine’s Humanist
Judaism likewise. (Wine studied philosophy at the University of Michigan, where he
was particularly impressed by logical positivism.) The credal content of Modern
Orthodoxy remains to a great extent that of traditional Orthodoxy modernised, as set
out by Hirsch in his doctrine of Torah im derech eretz (the written law with worldly
civility). Mordecai Menachem Kaplan, Judaism as a Civilization: Toward a
Reconstruction of American–Jewish Life (Philadelphia, 1957); Sherwin T Wine,
Judaism beyond God: a Radical New Way to be Jewish (Society for Humanistic
Judaism, 1995).
John Bacon
301
mistake, an indication that Judaism isn’t really a religion at all. But
on the whole, it’s Christians who make the mistake, imagining that if
they think carefully, naturalistically avoiding the virgin birth, the
loaves and the fishes, the wedding feast at Cana, the temptation by
the devil, the stone rolled away and so on, they will safeguard their
religion and its place in the world. But religions don’t work like that.
They involve thought and action (and feeling). The thought can be to
some extent curtailed, the action not so easily.
We needn’t rest with the argument from meaningfulness alone to sub-
stantiate God’s existence. Let’s look at St Thomas’s ‘Five Ways’ of
arguing to that conclusion.16 The Five Ways are: 1. The argument to
the first cause; 2. The argument from the sustenance of the world; 3.
The argument from the world’s arising out of nothing; 4. The
argument from design: 5. The argument to the final cause. I submit
that the cogency of (1) and (2) is pretty straightforward (pace a
swarm of thinkers who have pooh-poohed them). (3) doesn’t work;
it’s a pity that Thomas, who took so much from Aristotle, ignored the
Stagirite views on the ur-void. (Ironically, the lame (3) is generally
agreed to be Thomas’s best ‘proof’.)
We get a close parallel to (4) if we construe ‘design’ as beauty. Just
as explanatory ethical theory presupposes objective, absolute value,
so also aesthetic explanation presupposes objective, absolute
beauty.17 The two normative theories are parallel in this regard. I
would suggest that Einstein espoused some such view when he said,
‘Raffiniert ist der Herr; boshaft ist er nicht!’ and the famous ‘Gott
würfelt nicht’ (unless he was joking; you never can tell with
Einstein). He also said, ‘We have to admire in humility the beautiful
harmony of the structure of this world, as far as we can grasp it. That
                                                           
16 Thomas’s writings more than repay the effort: Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica I, qu 2, 3 in An Aquinas Reader, ed Mary T Clark (Garden City, 1972)
122f. See Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London, 2006) 77ff.
17 This does not mean that all beauty, as apprehended, is objective. I would balk at
the suggestion of the objective beauty of Paris Hilton, Disneyland or the Denver Art
Museum. Examples of objective beauty may perhaps be found in Sarah Silverman,
Mozart’s Piano Concerto #21 or the Main Quadrangle Building of Sydney
University.
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is all’.18 When I say ‘presupposes’, I mean that, as an explanatory
framework, ethical theory results from the inference to the best
explanation from experience. Similarly, as an explanatory congeries
of hypotheses, aesthetics arises by argument to the best explanation
from our experience of beauty. It moves us with unanticipated force,
like the non-lover’s beloved in the Phaidros.19 (A r s longa, vita
brevis.) The ‘dull, sublunary lovers’ love’ that is in the eye of the
voyeur is not necessarily less striking or less intense, but simply local
and evanescent. (Ernst ist das Leben, frivol ist die Kunst.) Objective
beauty is eternal.20 Explanations have to stop somewhere, but they
needn’t stop at the level of moral and aesthetic theory. To the extent
that they explain and are well-confirmed, these theories cry out for
further explanation. This explanation we may call God.
There remains the Fifth Way of St Thomas: the argument to the final
cause. This argument prevails when we become conscious that we
must do something, that enhancing some component of the world is
called for, that sometimes we are genuinely consoled (perhaps by
ourselves; perhaps by love; perhaps by prayer), or that an aspect of
our life is meaningful to some degree and capable of becoming more
so (knock on wood!). When we experience any of these things in our
lives, argument to the best explanation leads straight to God.
Historical Anticipations of Ætistic Gnosticism
The God of Ætism differs from the Christian God in that he is not a
saviour who dies on the cross to save us all from our sins on the
condition that we believe in him and he doesn’t talk to us, although
                                                           
18 Letter of Albert Einstein, 1945, quoted in Banesh Hoffmann, Albert Einstein,
Creator and Rebel (New York, 1972) 195.
19 See n 3 supra.
20 John Bacon, ‘Real Beauty’, Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics
Colloquium (4 October 1991); Eddy M Zemach, ‘Real Beauty’, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 16, 1991, 249–265 and Real Beauty (College Park, 1997). I didn’t
collude with my friend; we thought of the title independently. (Abduction from this
coincidence leads to the beautiful itself or at any rate the serendipitous itself. Dies
zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.)
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he sustains the world. It’s not clear that he intervenes in the world
from day to day to tidy up his creation. Nor does he, like the deist
god, lay down the entire future by setting a cosmic mousetrap at the
outset, as it were, and then running away. Modern science is
indeterministic, leaving scope for God’s will to assert itself.
The God of Ætism may appear to be fundamentally different from the
God of Judaism. It’s fatal to take a simplistic view of Old Testament
interpretation, however. Reputable scholars are agreed that several
voices speak to us in the Tanach and how they are related to each
other is not satisfactorily understood. Without going into details, we
have as sources the Yahwist J, the Elohist E, the extended Elohist E+
and the Priestly code P. When the OT God says famously ‘I am that I
am’, there are many interpretations and it is not known which is right.
When God gives his name, he may be concealing his real
(unannounced) name or giving a definite description (whose
uniqueness conditions may themselves be unknown). These diffi-
culties and uncertainties with God’s name are repeated through much
of the OT text. Interpreting it correctly could be the lifetime work of a
committee of scholars (like the committee that produced the King
James text.)
The closest historically significant precursor of Ætism is
Unitarianism. The main difference between Unitarianism and Ætism
concerns the personhood of the Unitarian God (though some
Unitarians reject this tenet in favour of a deistic God). Similar to
Unitarianism credally, though not ritually, is Orthodox Judaism. Next
in affinity to Ætism is gnosticism, accounted a heresy in the early
Church partly because it was rampant and therefore perceived as a
rival. The two best-known versions of gnostic religion are the version
that was combated by the early Church (the creed of conscientious
Christian apostates and feminists) and Zoroastrianism in Persia. We
may distinguish two basic types of gnosticiam, which I call ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ gnosticism. Hard gnosticism is ditheistic, its adherents
believing in two gods: the first, deus absconditus, the creator of the
world, a component of which was the second, the god active today.
It’s a bit like a modern corporation with a strong, creative founder
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who gets it off the ground and then resigns, appointing a successor to
do the actual CEO work for years to come.21
We can view the hard gnostic position as a failed, or at any rate
wildly implausible, attempt at explanatory hypothesising. A little
investigation and a little imagination suffice to persuade us that one
god is enough, if not more than enough. The deus absconditus is out
of work from our hypothetico-deductive point of view. His abduction
fails. (‘Abduction’ is Peirce’s term for inference to the best explan-
ation.) Ætism has a greater affinity with soft gnosticism. This type of
religion is monotheistic and highly plausible to many serious Western
religious thinkers, among whom the Zoroastrians provide a
historically prominent example. However, this religion includes one
component that will have no place in Ætism: dualism. It teaches that
the world is under the sway of a good principle, God or Ormazd or
Ahura-Mazda, and an evil principle, Ahriman or Angra-Mainyu or
Satan.22 The vicissitudes of the actual world reflect the eternal fight
between God and Satan.
The dualism of soft gnosticism, unlike ditheism, is plausible. As a
hypothesis, it seems to answer to what we actually see going on
around us: bad fights good till good turns around and kneecaps evil.
Although we have a predilection for good (in spite of our sinfulness)
the battle is never resolved. If it were, the world would grind to a halt.
(Perhaps it would expire at the heat-death of Sol.) But, although
dualism appeals to many, it is not the best explanation of our
experience. A principle of good is sufficient. The evil that claims our
                                                           
21 As an example, at Wolfson (Iffley) College, Oxford, where I was a Member of
Common Room in 1986, the prominent founding President was the philosopher and
cultural historian Sir Isaiah Berlin. Once the building was nearing completion, Sir
Isaiah withdrew into the background, to be succeeded by Professor John Morrison.
Wolfson thus had a bi-presidential administrative structure: the praesidens
absconditus, Sir Isaiah, having been decisive in the founding of the College, threw
his influence behind Morrison, who was duly appointed the first President.
22 In some versions, Ormazd creates Ahriman as an intentional object just by thinking
of him, a conception which aggravates the problem of evil for Zoroastrian
theologians. Note also Elaine Pagels’ reinterpretation (or restoration) of ‘Satan’, who
has had a bad press: Elaine Pagels, The Origin of Satan (New York, 1995).
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attention may exist in the corners that God didn’t get around to
cleaning up.
Here the problem of evil rears its ugly head. As we shall see, the
solution to this difficult theological problem is simply to
acknowledge that God is neither omniscient nor omnipotent. Like a
benevolent but understanding parent, he lets us muck about on our
own a great deal. From that we learn more than if God fixed
everything up for us. If mum always picks up our socks for us, we’ll
never learn to keep our room tidy for ourselves. If God never lets a
murderer go free, we’ll never learn how to rehabilitate murderers, nor
how to discourage their recidivism.
A Gnosticism Almost Worthy of Ætism
One very inspiring modern version of soft gnosticism is found in Mo-
zart’s Magic Flute. This brilliant psychodrama, with its
transcendently inspiring arias and moving instrumental passages, was
deliberately written by Mozart and his lodge-brother Schikaneder in
order to convey the essence of the guild of freemasonry, to which
they both belonged. Their realised intention (a striking case of
objective beauty) reaches right down into obscure details of the
opera. Listen to the overture for a couple of seconds and then turn it
off. What did you hear? Three successive notes or chords, first the
tonic, then the prolonged dominant seventh, then the tonic again, one
octave higher. This represents the number three, invested with
extensive arcane significance by the freemasons. As you turn the
opera back on, you’ll notice several groups of three as the opera
progresses, even groups of three threes: the three ladies, the three
boys, the three priests, the three acts.23 The masons didn’t invent the
mystical significance of three. As father-mother-child, it is absolutely
central to our genesis and self-consciousness as human beings. The
most significant familial triad of all – Joseph, Mary, Jesus – reminds
                                                           
23 Only two acts of the opera are actually performed. It’s my exegetical contention,
however, that a third act is implicit, constituting the progress of the marriage of
Tamino and Pamina and culminating in their succession to Sarastro, where he
becomes chief of the masonic temple. Next, Pamina bears their first child ‘and baby
makes three’.
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us that the Christian God is held to be triune: Father, Son, Holy Spirit.
Growing up in a Christian society imprints us with the triad, as does
growing up in a nuclear family.
The overture ends with another triad. In the jacket notes to the Karl
Böhm recording, Andreas Holschneider explains:
If the affect of the characters and situations is clarified by the choice of keys
and instruments, if the old contrapuntal techniques vividly allegorize the
striving endeavour, then the threefold intensifying chord strokes, like the
number three in general, its square, and its double bespeak the basic free-
masonic symbols in Mozart’s composition.24
The Magic Flute is a parable of maturation. The young people at the
center of the action mature into their adult roles, even the flighty bird-
man Papageno. Sarastro and his assistants act as tutors or guides to
the young people. (The name ‘Sarastro’ is generally thought to derive
from ‘Zoroaster’.) The youths are subjected to trials, which may seem
ridiculous, but both Pamina and Papageno come close to suicide, so
desperate are they to be reunited with their partners. Pamina must
decide whether to renounce her mother and is nearly raped by
Monostatos (whose name, literally ‘standing one’, probably connotes
‘phallus’). The ultimate trial is the Queen of the Night’s raid on
Sarastro’s Temple of the Sun. (She is paired with Monostatos.) The
limp raid is easily repulsed, almost as if by magic. By now Pamina
can bear the separation from her mother (the Queen of the Night),
whom she still loves. The opera closes:
Priester: Triumph! Triumph! Du edles Paar
Besieget hast du die Gefahr.
Der Isis Weihe ist nun dein;
kommt, tretet in den Tempel ein!
Sarastro: Die Strahlen der Sonne vertreiben die Nacht,
zernichten der Heuchler erschlichene Macht.
Priester: Heil sei euch Geweihten!
                                                           
24 Andreas Holshneider, ‘Zauberspuk und philosophische Oper’ in program notes to
Die Zauberflöte, Karl Böhm, dir., Berliner Philharmoniker & RIAS Kammerchor
(Deutsche Grammophon, #138 982) 8.
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Heil sie euch Geweihten!
Ihr dranget durch Nacht.
Dank sei dir, Isis; dank sei dir, Osiris, gebracht!
Es siegte die Stärke und krönet zum Lohn
die Schönheit und Weisheit mit ewiger Kron’!
The reference to Isis and Osiris is masonic lore – so too the
invocation of ‘the gods’. We have already seen that the gnosticism of
The Magic Flute is dualistic: the antipode of Sarastro is the Queen of
the Night. Is it also polytheistic? I doubt it. The invocation of the
gods is a stylised formula. The gods are never represented as doing
anything.25 If any, it’s Isis and Osiris who would be the (dualistic)
gods. They’re also female and male, father and mother. As against the
problematic Sarastro/Queen, Osiris/Isis are a totally benign couple.
There is one very moving passage, to be sure, in which ‘the gods’
play more than a bit part. It comes near the end of the opera, just as
Pamina is to attempt suicide (because she hasn’t seen her boyfriend
Tamino for a couple of hours):
Dann ist die Erd’ ein Himmelreich,
und Sterbliche den Göttern gleich.
[Then the earth shall be a Heavenly realm,
and mortals like to Gods.]26
Earth as a Heaven, men like gods: these are characteristic gnostic fan-
tasies. Yet their meaning is as serious as it is straightforward. What is
affirmed here is ‘the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man’.
Earth will be a Heaven when the fatherhood of God is acknowledged;
we shall be like gods when we have established the brotherhood of
man. (And let us forgo petty terminological squabbles here: this
means the siblinghood of all mankind, including women.) To the
Christian, this sounds vaguely blasphemous: like gods indeed! But
this is a poetic way of saying that a new day will dawn when we’re
all as brothers. That’s exactly what the American Civil Rights
movement preached: ‘All men are slaves till their brothers are free’. It
is not blasphemy but a very practical idealism.
                                                           
25 In Zoroastrianism, the picture is complicated by the Fravashis, prototypes of men
and oxen created by God during the first of three eras of earth.
26 ‘The Three Boys’, Act II, Scene 25.
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I’m wandering from Ætism, since I love The Magic Flute in all its
nuances. To come back to the gods and the apparent dualism of the
opera. The Sarastro/Queen couple is definitely dualistic. Do we have
in Osiris/Isis ditheism? I think not. Hooking on to supposed ancient
Egyptian lore was all the go with the freemasons. The lore was secret
(some of it still is). We shouldn’t be surprised to find some masonic
role or other accorded to practically every figure of Egyptian myth.
My maternal grandfather, Frederick Zeitler Bennett, was a 33rd-
degree Mason. (Notice the three-three.) He was so loyal to the order
that he refused to go to church with my grandmother and his
daughter, my mother. He had his own church, he said, the Zenobia
Shrine of the Scottish Rite of his Masonic Order. He would never
have revealed the Masonic secrets to anyone, but he had a formula to
sum up what for him was the central teaching of freemasonry: ‘the
fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man’. Who is this ‘God’,
given that there was no real God in The Magic Flute but only stylised
‘gods’. I take it that my grandfather’s ‘God’ was no more nor less
than the Isis/Osiris/gods of the opera. In Ætism, God is explicated as
first cause/meaning-giver/best explanation/final cause. The masons
probably never got so far in the details of their exoteric teaching. I’ve
expounded the similarities and differences between Ætism and The
Magic Flute. To me, they are compelling and endlessly fascinating, to
the extent that they genuinely cast light on one another. That the
religion of the opera is heretical need not detain us. I’m not trying to
illuminate Christianity but to advocate Ætism.
Atrocities in the Old Testament
Although my title alludes to Dawkins,27 the main drift of my study is
against him. Nevertheless, when it comes to the crucifixion, I’m with
him all the way28 – and so too with the atrocities of the OT he
discusses, the worst of the OT: the murder of the Levite’s concubine
and the massacre of the Benjamites in reprisal. Contra Dawkins, it’s
not the case that God perpetrated all these acts. In fact, some of the
                                                           
27 Dawkins, op cit.
28 Ibid, 252.
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atrocities reported were probably committed without the complicity
of any god. But be that as it may, we Ætists are under absolutely no
constraint to lay it all at the feet of Yahweh, let alone our God. This is
a significant objection to Dawkins’ account. As he combs the Bible to
glean ‘biblical morality’ from the alleged behaviour of God, he
overlooks entirely that to report conduct is not to condone or advo-
cate it. Everybody knows this. When the local paper reports a murder,
we don’t take it as a moral command to go out and commit another
murder. Gleaning the morality of the Bible is a far subtler matter; I
doubt that it can be done. The Bible doesn’t report and illustrate one
moral system, but many. And it doesn’t deliver formulas but rather
ambiguous illustrations. Only over the long haul does it approximate
proselytisation for a morality.
But, in the spirit of Dawkins, there are two OT examples where we’re
less than thrilled by Yahweh’s approach to his Hebrew children’s
affairs. The OT God speaks to them, explains political developments,
intervenes in their projects, vaunts his jealousy, turns the tide of
battles and rewards or punishes individuals. The Book of Job, for
example, is very moving and has doubtless inspired many religious
readers. Yet Satan intervenes actively in Job’s life, while God sits
back and watches with the detachment of a couch-potato to see how
Job will take all the setbacks Satan is able to mete out to him. In the
end God gives back to Job the equivalent of what he has lost and we
have a ‘happy ending’. Job gets a new wife and with her begets as
many sons and daughters as he had before the Satanic experiment
commenced. However, we know that each human being is unique and
irreplaceable, and that goes for Job’s first family too. The advent of
ten new children by no means compensates the loving parent for the
ten lost children, a stolen generation of Job-offspring, as it were. For
that matter, the healing of Job from boils is not full recompense, since
Job will likely remember the pain of those boils all his life. He may
dream of them in nightmares, if Yahweh doesn’t step in with some
celestial chloral hydrate. Job nevertheless forgave God the terrible
sufferings the deity had countenanced. Would you have done the
same? Job may be a good story, an edifying and inspiring story even.
But we’re under no obligation to believe it ever happened. If it did, I
think a better explanation of Job’s terrible sufferings can be found
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than the cruel and callous agency of Satan, abetted by a voyeuristic
Yahweh.
Perhaps the most horrible story in the entire OT is the account of the
confrontation of the children of Israel with the Benjamites.29 It starts
with the attempt of a conscientious host to spare his male guest gang
buggery and sexual abuse. A quotation will give the flavour of
events. (I translate freely, rather than drawing on the King James):
[The Levite’s host speaks to the rabble:] ‘Behold, here are my virgin
daughter and the Levite’s concubine; let me bring them out now. Ravish
them and do with them what you like; but against this man [the Levite guest]
don’t do so vile a thing’ ... and they abused her [the concubine] all night until
the morning. As the dawn began to break, they let her go ... Her master [the
Levite] too rose up in the morning, and when he opened the door of the
house, ... behold: there was his concubine lying on the threshold ... He said to
her, ‘Get up, let’s be going’. But there was no answer ... He took a knife and
laying hold of his concubine he divided her, limb from limb, into twelve
pieces, and sent her throughout all the territory of Israel. [Then the people
said] ‘Such a thing has never happened or been seen from the day that the
people of Israel came up out of the land of Egypt until this day’. (Judges
20:24-30)
What do you suppose happened next? The Israelites, compatriots of
the Levite, attacked the Benjamites (the tribe of the concubine’s
abusers). Yahweh was there to cheer them on:
And the men of Israel rounded on the Benjamites, and smote them with the
edge of the sword, men and beasts and all that they found. And all the towns
which they found they set on fire ... And the people [of Israel] lifted up their
voices and wept bitterly. And they said, ‘O Lord, God of Israel, why has this
come to pass in Israel, that there should be today one tribe lacking in Israel?’
... [The Benjamite] Yevash-Gilead was there. So the congregation sent thither
twelve thousand of their bravest men, and commanded them, ‘Go and smite
the inhabitants of Yevash-Gilead with the edge of the sword; also the women
and the little ones. Every man [woman, and child] you shall utterly destroy’.
(Judges 20:48–21:10)
                                                           
29 Dawkins cites this case too. I’ve worried for years about the Banjamites and the
Amalekites. (I’ve never heard the relevant passages read out as the OT lesson in
church, I must say!)
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(They did not actually do it, but did massacre a considerable number
of the Yevash-Gileadites.) The account may be based on an actual
historical incident. It is absolutely horrifying to read. Did Israel really
do this with the Lord’s complicity? Either way, the sins lay at the feet
of the men of Israel or their commanders. We Ætists have no reason
to believe that God did any of it. The dreadful war with the Ben-
jamites need not be reckoned among God’s sins, properly understood.
The perpetrators were the ones who did it!
On an intuitive level, Dawkins’ (and Hodgson’s30) critique of the
Lord compares in subtlety with that of Lord Randolph Churchill
(father of Winston). As a young man, like many sons of the
aristocracy with time on their hands, Churchill enlisted for a stint
with His Majesty’s troops. At one point his division was becalmed
and the men had a couple of days to sit around and occupy
themselves as best they could. Not being bookish, Randolph had not
packed a novel with which to amuse himself during the lull. Taking
pity on him, his mates lent him a copy of the only extra book they had
on hand, the Bible. Randolph retired to his tent with the book under
his arm, to relieve the doldrums even with such boring reading
matter. After a few hours, his fellow soldiers were startled by loud
cries emanating from the same tent: ‘God is a shit! God is a shit!’31
I have one last bone to pick with Dawkins. With astonishing recall, he
quotes a hymn fifty years after he learned it:
Christian, dost thou see them
On the holy ground?
How the troops of Midian
Prowl and prowl around
Christian, up and smite them,
Counting gain but loss.
Smite them by the merit
Of the holy cross.32
                                                           
30 David Hodgson, ‘Dawkins and the Morality of the Bible’, Quadrant 51.5, 2007,
38–43 (review of Dawkins, op cit).
31 Anecdote with liberties from DM Armstrong, Challis Professor of Philosophy
Emeritus, University of Sydney Staff Club, left rear table.
32 Dawkins, op cit, 245.
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Well, I too learned that hymn about fifty years ago; it is my favourite.
Dawkins takes it to celebrate the massacre of the Midiänites, an
interpretation which never occurred to me, even in my most fervent
Christian period. Perhaps this is due to the fact that I learned the
correct text:
Christian, dost thou see them
on the holy ground?
How the powers of darkness
rage thy steps around?
Christian, up and smite them,
counting gain but loss
in the strength that cometh
by the Holy Cross.33
Thus an allegory of a military battle resisting Satan becomes in
Dawkins’ hyperactive brain an advocacy of massacre. No wonder
he’s down on the God ‘delusion’!34 The moral: know your sources
before you issue polemic in writing (particularly controversial
polemic) otherwise it may backfire!
Who’s that Guy up in the Sky?
To the believer-in-the-street (any street) what may be deeply
offputting about Ætism is the lack of a guarantee that its God is a
person. Christians and Jews alike (with the possible exception of
Secular Humanist Jews and some Unitarians) are accustomed to seek
solace in direct conversations with God. The Christians make it
official: God is a member of the Trinity and, in another of his
Trinitarian guises, he is the man Jesus. The human Christian God, or
Son thereof, eats, quarrels with his mother, wrestles with temptation,
answers our prayers and hears our adoring hymns, no doubt with a
human aural sense of pitch. Compared to gentle Jesus, meek and
mild, the God of Ætism is definitely a drink of cold water.
                                                           
33 Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, The Hymnal (Philadelphia, 1933) no
275.
34 I suppose that the old standby ‘Onward, Christian Soldiers’ (hardly an instance of
deathless musical inspiration, admittedly) upsets him equally.
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This is the most burning question thrown up by Ætism, which is
otherwise a carefully worked-out, benign, logical and rationalistic
system of religion and theology: is God a person, a conscious being
who acts in the world and hears our prayers? My answer: we don’t
know, but it’s not likely. Such a hypothesis is not incompatible with
Ætism, but neither is it entailed by it. There may be something about
the world, or our experience of it, that is explained or partially
explained by the hypothesis that God is a person. I wouldn’t rule it
out, but frankly I should put little stock in such a hypothesis.35 For
example, it may be that a change of heart such as that experienced by
Jean Valjean36 or Silas Marner37 or Richard Henchard38 presupposes
something causally innovative beating in their breast, which no
human being (themselves included), nor buzz of atoms, nor cloud of
radiation, could have effected. Perhaps God softened their heart; what
do we know? Stranger things have happened, we might concede.
You might think that Christianity minus messianic redemption would
simply be mainstream Judaism. That isn’t exactly true. The Jews are
represented in the Torah as praying to and conversing with God all
the time. Ætism doesn’t affirm such communication, but accepts it
provisionally as an hypothesis. The OT has a concept of sin and we
know, of course, that sin does actually occur from time to time (too
often, more’s the pity). It’s not clear what the status of sin would be
in Ætism: presumably a failure of moral duty rather than of obedience
to God. The question cries out for closer scrutiny. The Jews and the
Christians, then, have their sin; Ætism does not, or not in the same
sense (though Ætists can of course be just as evil.)
                                                           
35 But note: ‘The most intelligent, interesting and ethically valuable things we know
about directly are humans, which are personal. It is hard to imagine how such things
could have arisen from a completely non-personal divinity, or why it would have
wanted ... to produce any such things’.  James Franklin, ‘Letter to Editor’, Quadrant
51:6, 2007, re: Hodgson, op cit.
36 Victor Hugo, Les Misérables (Brussels, 1862).
37 Eliot, op cit.
38 Thomas Hardy, Life and Death of the Mayor of Casterbridge: a Story of a Man of
Character (London, 1975).
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But What Would Jesus Say?
Not all sincere believers in some version of the Judaeo-Christian faith
put Jesus at stage center. All the same, he is a uniquely awe-inspiring,
engaging man, whom we are strongly motivated to consult, both on
religious matters and on questions of human and emotional conduct.
So what would Jesus make of Ætism? My reading of the synoptic
Gospels suggests that Ætism doesn’t fulfil the whole of Jesus’
religious faith and practice: he prayed sometimes and referred to God
or the Lord as doing things that made a difference in the world. He
ended his life with a direct, moving appeal to God. This was not a
man who denied the personhood of God.
On the matter of Messianic salvation the picture is cloudier. The doc-
trine of salvation from the cross is essentially Pauline. No one can
deny that Jesus seems to have considered his death to be meaningful,
not just a waste of human or divine resources. But it’s hard to accept
the resurrection: such things just don’t happen, we’re strongly
inclined to say. How, then, do we explain Jesus’ striking earthly
apparitions after his death?39 I suspect that the gospel-writers made
them up or drew on fabricated sources such as Q or the Toledot
Yeshu that may have come to be accepted in the fledgling Church.
We know that the gospels were not written down until about 65 years
after Jesus’ death. That leaves time for a lot of water under the
bridge, a lot of busy creativity, not to mention bowdlerisation.
One of the most striking things about the Jesus tradition is the impu-
tation of divinity. Trinitarians hold that the three Persons are distinct
from each other and that they are yet all One. This has been dismissed
as flagrantly illogical by arrogant agnostics and atheists. But it can be
innocuously reconciled with logic as follows: the three Persons are
not identical with each other but are distinct; they merely bear a
strong equivalence relation to each other. (An equivalence relation is
one that is reflexive, symmetric and transitive.) Such a relation
partitions its field into equivalence classes. One of these classes is the
Trinity (Father, Jesus, Holy Spirit). But what is the equivalence
                                                           
39 Mark 16:9–20; Luke 24.
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relation? We’re hard put to say. Thus this logical reconstruction of
the Trinity is somewhat empty – even if mathematically quite tenable.
It’s noteworthy that Jesus seems often to refer to himself as ‘the Son
of Man’. Who’s that? Perhaps most Christians read it as a kind of
informal or secularising euphemism for ‘Son of God’. The Son of
Man just is the second Person in the Trinity. Quite the contrary: the
Son of Man is by definition a man, not God or any aspect thereof. To
be sure, he claims on occasion to be the Messiah, as when he
addresses the Samaritan woman at the well (who is living with her
fifth partner):
The woman said to him, ‘I know that Messiah is coming ...; when he comes,
he will show us all things’. Jesus said to her, ‘I who speak to you am he’.
(John 4:25f)
This could easily have been interpolated by the evangelist to make a
convincing story. (Regarding the Samaritans as irretrievably apostate,
Jews would have had reservations about acknowledging the
Samaritan messiah.) When Jesus says, ‘The Son of Man has nowhere
to lay his head’, it’s not the second Person of the Trinity who needs a
pillow; it’s a man. The Son of God would have other resources for
getting forty winks. The ‘Son of Man’ tradition was not Jesus’
invention. It goes back at least to Ezekiel and Second Isaiah, a
Psalms-like book of the Prophets containing passages that have
moved Christian and Hassidic messianists alike through the ages. In
Ezekiel, the narrator (presumably Ezekiel) begins nearly every
chapter with ‘And thou, O son of man …’, representing God as
speaking to him.
The following passage furnishes the lyrics of one of the loveliest
oratorios ever (have you not heard?):
Comfort ye, comfort ye my people, saith your God.
The voice of one that crieth,
‘In the wilderness, prepare ye the way of Yahweh:
make straight in the desert a highway for our God’.
Every valley shall be exalted, and every hill made low,
and the crooked shall be made straight,
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and the rough places plane.
The glory of Yahweh shall be revealed,
and all flesh shall see it together:
for the mouth of Yahweh hath spoken it.
Behold, a maiden shall conceive, and bear a son,
and his name shall be called ‘Immanuel’.
O Zion, that bringest good tidings,
get thee up into the high mountains.
O Jerusalem, that bringest good tidings,
lift up thy voice with strength; lift it up, be not afraid.
Say unto the cities of Judah, ‘Behold your God’.
He shall feed his flock like a shepherd:
he shall gather the lambs with his arm,
and carry them in his bosom,
and shall gently lead those that are with young.
(Isaiah 7:14; 40:1–11)
The words ‘Son of Man’ don’t appear here, but that’s what Isaiah is
talking about. Immanuel, ‘God with us’, is not God but the son of a
maiden, a (possibly unwed)40 mother who named him ‘God with us’.
Jerusalem is adjured to say, ‘Behold your God’, but it doesn’t mean
that Jerusalem points to itself and claims to be God, nor that Mary
points to her baby and says, ‘This is God’. It means that Jerusalem
and Judah are to acknowledge Yahweh as their God because the babe,
the son of a maiden, has appeared amongst them. The son of man,
like his cousin, is a harbinger, not a pretender. If we had any lingering
doubts about the identity of the Lord and the Son, Second Isaiah
helpfully explains:
To whom then will you liken God,
or what likeness compare with him? ...
Have you not known? Have you not heard?
Has it not been told you from the beginning?
Have you not understood from the foundations of the earth?
It is he who sits above the circle of the earth,
and its inhabitants are like grasshoppers.
Who stretches out the heavens like a curtain,
and spreads them like a tent to dwell in ...
‘To whom then will you compare me,
that I should be like him?’
says the Holy One.
                                                           
40 For more lurid gossip about the Holy Family, see Toledot Yeshu.
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Lift up your eyes on high and see:
Who created these? ...
Have you not known?
Have you not heard?
Yahweh is the everlasting God,
the Creator of the ends of the earth. (Isaiah 40:18–28)
God is the Creator: it couldn’t be made more plain. Ætism accepts
this (on good authority, you see). It’s likely that even Jesus, with his
impressive training in the oral and written law, would have figured
this out.
The Problem of Evil
One of the knottiest problems of theology is the problem of evil. The
atheist Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov rejects God because at least
one child has suffered at some point.41 For many thoughtful people,
God and evil simply cannot coexist in the same world. What does the
Ætist think? A New York University colleague Steven J Brams
suggested the answer to me thirty years ago: God is not omnipotent.42
Some evil exists for which God is not responsible. At a stroke this
obviates the need for predestination, in which as a Presbyterian I was
so thoroughly drilled. Denying the omnipotence of God makes free
will tenable. This is welcome, in my view, because the evidence for
the freedom of the human will is overwhelming.
When a particle is fired through a small slit, it may be deflected either
left or right according to the quantum theory. Either way, we need not
lay responsibility for the behaviour of the particle at the feet of God.
God may be a spectator of the experiment, just as we are. (Of course,
observers may affect the experiment, as Heisenberg pointed out.) But
God has other fish to fry. In this he is no different from us, even if he
has no government research grant to conduct research at HILAC.43
                                                           
41 Fyodor Dostoyevski, The Brothers Karamazov, trans Constance Garnett and Ralph
E Matlaw (Harmondsworth, 1958).
42 Steven Brams, Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible (Cambridge,
2003) 4.
43 The Heavy Ion Linear Accelerator at Berkeley (which I was privileged to inspect
in the summer of 1957, when I still wanted to be a nuclear physicist).
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So How Good is God?
According to the Puritan tradition, God is very good but is
characterised in terms that make him sound quite evil. Here is what
the greatest Puritan preacher has had to say:
The God that holds you over the pit of hell much as one holds a spider or
some loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked;
his wrath toward you burns like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing
else but to be cast into the fire; he is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in
his sight; you are ten thousand times so abominable in his eyes as the most
hateful and venomous serpent is in ours.44
I don’t suppose many of us would want such a God for our father, let
alone as the telos of our virtuous actions. Jonathan Edwards may have
recommended this God to his parishioners sincerely, but how many
of them make it back to church the following Sunday? Edwards’
sermon is planted squarely in a prominent Judæo-Christian tradition,
that of ‘Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord’. The God of Ætism
doesn’t say that. Perhaps he says nothing at all.
Traditionally, God is reckoned to be perfect. What of the God of
Ætism? I have claimed that the positing of God is the conclusion of
an argument to the best explanation. In general, being the best expla-
nation does not make the explanans a good thing. When Ignác
Semmelweis discovered that germs on dirty hands caused puerperal
fever, it didn’t make those germs good.45 All the same, when we
approve of an action as undertaken for the sake of the ur-telos, it
would be odd to hold simultaneously that the ur-telos was not good.
If it were not good, then acting for its sake would lose its point. We
seem to be close here to the classical view that some things are good
for their own sake. The ur-telos, God, is good for its/his own sake.
Otherwise, it’s not clear how he could fill the role of the final cause
of earthly striving for improvement.
                                                           
44 Jonathan Edwards, ‘Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God’ in John E Smith et al
(eds) A Jonathan Edwards Reader (New Haven, 1995) 520.
45 For Semmelweis’s investigation of childbed fever, see Carl G Hempel, Philosophy
of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, 1966) 3f.
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Comfort Ye, My People
The heretical religion of Ætism may seem like cold comfort to the
traditional believer. All I can say is that agnosticism and atheism, the
most popular theological positions among secular humanists46 and
intellectuals of our day, is even colder comfort. I pray that it will
catch on – not that my praying will make any difference. I’m too
pessimistic about mankind’s defining characteristic of rationality to
expect a new dawn of Ætism tormorrow. I close with an invocation
that may have been spoken by the Israelites at Mizpah, just before
they butchered the Benjamites: ‘May Yahweh watch between me and
thee, while we are absent one from the other’. That formula, known
as the ‘Mizpah benediction’, is frequently recited at the close of
Protestant worship services. But Yahweh will oblige off his own bat,
not in answer to prayer.
                                                           
46 Adherents of Secular Humanist Judaism excepted.

